张利斌,张 航.基于委托代理理论的众包奖金模式研究[J].中南民族大学学报自然科学版,2017,(1):138-142
基于委托代理理论的众包奖金模式研究
Research on Awards Model of Crowdsourcing Based on Principal Agent Theory
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 固定奖金  绩效奖金  委托代理  线性  众包
英文关键词: fixed bonus  performance bonus  principal agent  linear  crowdsourcing
基金项目:国家社会科学基金资助项目(12BGL046) ,中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CSZ11005)
作者单位
张利斌,张 航 中南民族大学 经济学院湖北武汉 430074 
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中文摘要:
      基于委托代理理论,以单人中标悬赏模式为例,分析了固定奖金在众包中适用的原因; 在线性委托代理模型中加入参与者技能水平、 任务难易程度以及精神激励等变量, 探讨了绩效奖金中参与者努力程度和发包方激励 系数的影响因素. 结果表明: 参与者技能水平、 竞争性的环境、 个人兴趣、 激励系数正向影响参与者的努力水平, 而 成本系数和任务的难易程度负向影响参与者的努力水平; 参与者技能水平正向影响激励系数, 而竞争性的环境、 个 人兴趣、 风险规避度、 任务的难易程度、 成本系数负向影响激励系数.
英文摘要:
      Taking a single person winning bid as an example, the paper analyzed the applicability of fixed bonus model in crowdsourcing based on principal agent theory firstly. Then some factors such as the skill level of the participants, the task difficulty level and spiritual motivation were added to the linear principal agent model; and what affect the effort degree of participants and the setting of incentive coefficient of the employers were discussed within the model of performance bonus.Results showed that the skill level of the participants, competitive environment, personal interest and incentive coefficient had positive effects on the effort degree of participants, whereas cost coefficient and task difficulty level had negative effects on it. In addition, the skill level of the participants positively affected the incentive coefficient, whereas competitive environment, personal interest, risk aversion, task difficulty level and cost coefficient negatively affected the incentive coefficient.
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